Judicial review, judicial activism and judicial accountability
Indian Constitutional Law - New Challenges · Unit V · Topic 17 of 21 · 5 min read
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Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.
Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.
1. Judicial review: the constitutional base
Unlike the United States, where review was inferred in Marbury v. Madison (1803), the Indian Constitution makes it express: Article 13 voids laws inconsistent with Part III, Article 32 gives a right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement, Article 226 empowers the High Courts, and Article 142 lets the Supreme Court pass any order necessary for complete justice. Review extends to constitutional amendments through the basic structure doctrine (previous note) and to executive action through the grounds of illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and proportionality.
2. What “activism” means
The word is used in at least three senses, and an answer should separate them:
- willingness to strike down legislative or executive action (the opposite of Thayerian deference);
- expansive interpretation creating rights not stated in the text (Article 21 after Maneka Gandhi);
- assumption of functions usually performed by the political branches: framing guidelines, supervising administration, appointing committees.
Upendra Baxi described Indian PIL as social action litigation, distinguishing it from American public interest law: it arose from the court’s own initiative after the Emergency, in part to recover legitimacy lost in ADM Jabalpur, and was aimed at the poor and the unrepresented. His essay “Taking Suffering Seriously” remains the classic account.
3. The tools of the activist court
- Standing. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 INSC 209 (the First Judges case): any member of the public acting bona fide may move the court on behalf of persons who cannot approach it because of poverty or disability.
- Epistolary jurisdiction and fact-finding. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, 1983 INSC 203: a letter was treated as a writ petition, and the Court appointed commissioners to investigate bonded labour, treating PIL as non-adversarial.
- Expanded rights. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, 1982 INSC 67 (Asiad workers): payment below minimum wage is forced labour under Article 23.
- Guidelines filling legislative gaps. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, 1997 INSC 604: guidelines on sexual harassment at work, drawn from CEDAW, binding until Parliament legislated (it did in 2013). D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1996 INSC 1508: arrest and detention requirements.
- Continuing mandamus. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997) the Court kept the hawala investigation pending and issued directions on CBI independence; environmental cases such as the M.C. Mehta and Godavarman matters have run for decades.
- Absolute liability. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1986 INSC 281 (oleum gas leak): an enterprise in a hazardous industry is absolutely liable, without the exceptions in Rylands v. Fletcher.
4. The critique
- Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. Courts are not accountable to voters and lack the expertise and information of the executive. Policy made by Bench is hard to revise.
- Capture of PIL. Middle-class and commercial petitioners have used PIL for aesthetic or environmental claims that sometimes harmed the poor (slum clearance, hawker removal), the reverse of its original purpose. Anuj Bhuwania’s Courting the People (2017) makes this argument in detail.
- Selectivity and inconsistency. The same court that is active on some issues has been slow on habeas corpus and liberty cases in others; activism depends on the Bench.
- Overreach. Examples cited include the national highway liquor ban, the ban on firecrackers, and directing the linking of rivers. Courts have themselves warned against it, for instance in Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass (2007).
5. Judicial accountability
The more power courts exercise, the louder the question of who checks them.
- Appointments. After the Second (1993) and Third (1998) Judges cases, appointments are made by the collegium. The NJAC was struck down in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (October 2015), but in a follow-up order (2015 INSC 285) the Court accepted the need to improve the collegium; the Memorandum of Procedure remains unsettled.
- Removal. Article 124(4) and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 require proved misbehaviour or incapacity and a special majority in each House. No judge has been removed; the 1993 motion against Justice V. Ramaswami failed in the Lok Sabha.
- Complaints. The in-house procedure adopted in 1999 handles complaints against judges internally. The 2025 inquiry concerning cash found at a High Court judge’s residence brought renewed demands for a statutory mechanism.
- Transparency. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019) the office of the Chief Justice was held to be a public authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, subject to protection of personal information and judicial independence. Judges’ asset declarations are published on a voluntary basis.
- Contempt. Article 129 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Truth is a defence since the 2006 amendment. The 2020 contempt conviction of a lawyer for two tweets drew criticism that contempt was being used to shield the court from criticism.
6. Comparative notes
In the United Kingdom, under parliamentary sovereignty, courts cannot strike down primary legislation; the Human Rights Act, 1998 allows only a declaration of incompatibility (section 4). The Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 created the UK Supreme Court and an independent Judicial Appointments Commission, which is the model the NJAC debate usually cites. In the United States, federal judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate; the politicisation of confirmations is the cautionary tale cited by defenders of the collegium.
How this is examined
“Judicial activism” was set as a short note in April 2024. Longer forms: “Judicial activism is judicial legislation. Comment”, or “Discuss PIL as an instrument of social justice”. Define, give the tools with one case each, then the critique, the accountability point and a stated conclusion.
Now try the real questions: Indian Constitutional Law - New Challenges past question papers.