Torts affecting domestic and other rights
Law of Torts · Unit IV · Topic 13 of 16 · 7 min read
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Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.
Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.
1. Interference with marital rights
At common law a husband could sue a third person who deprived him of the consortium (society, companionship and services) of his wife. The actions were:
- Loss of consortium by injury (per quod consortium amisit): where the defendant's tort injured the wife and the husband lost her company and services.
- Enticement and harbouring: persuading a wife to leave her husband, or keeping her away from him without justification.
- Adultery (criminal conversation): damages against the man who committed adultery with the wife.
The right was one-sided. In Best v. Samuel Fox & Co. Ltd. (1952), the House of Lords held that a wife had no action for loss of her husband's consortium when he was injured by the defendant's negligence. England abolished enticement and harbouring by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, and the husband's action for loss of consortium and services by the Administration of Justice Act, 1982.
In India these suits are rare. Adultery, once an offence against the husband under s.497 IPC, was struck down in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 INSC 898, (2019) 3 SCC 39, partly because it treated the wife as the husband's property; it remains a ground for divorce. Loss of consortium survives in a modern, gender-neutral form as a head of compensation in motor accident and other death claims, payable to spouse, children and parents.
2. Interference with parental rights
A parent could sue for loss of the services of a child injured or enticed away by the defendant (per quod servitium amisit). The best-known form was the action for seduction of a daughter, which was framed as loss of her services even when the real grievance was the dishonour. The parent had to show some service, however slight, such as making tea. Abduction or enticement of a minor child from the custody of a parent or guardian was also actionable. England abolished these actions in 1970. Today the child's own claim, and guardianship and custody law, do the work.
3. Rights to service
A master could sue a person who injured his servant and thereby deprived him of the servant's services, or who enticed or harboured the servant. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hambrook (1956), the Court of Appeal confined this action to menial or domestic servants living in the master's household, and refused it to the Crown for the loss of a civil servant's work. The action was abolished in England in 1982. The modern descendant is the tort of inducing breach of contract, which protects any contract, not only contracts of service.
4. Inducing breach of contract
In Lumley v. Gye (1853), the opera singer Johanna Wagner had contracted to sing exclusively at Lumley's theatre. Gye, who ran a rival theatre, knowingly persuaded her to break the contract and sing for him. Gye was held liable to Lumley. The tort extends the master's old remedy to every contract. Its essentials are:
- a valid and subsisting contract between the plaintiff and a third party;
- the defendant's knowledge of the contract;
- intention to procure its breach (it is not enough that breach was a foreseeable side-effect);
- a direct persuasion or inducement, or an indirect interference by unlawful means;
- an actual breach; and
- damage to the plaintiff.
Justification is a defence in narrow cases. In Brimelow v. Casson (1924), a union official induced theatre staff to break their contracts with a manager who paid chorus girls so little that they were driven to immorality. The inducement was justified by the moral duty to intervene. Commercial self-interest is not justification.
5. Intimidation
Intimidation is committed where the defendant threatens a third party with an unlawful act unless the third party acts to the plaintiff's detriment, and the third party complies. In Rookes v. Barnard (1964), Rookes had resigned from his union. Union officials told his employer, BOAC, that the members would strike, in breach of their contracts of employment, unless Rookes was dismissed. BOAC lawfully terminated his employment. The House of Lords held the officials liable: a threat to break a contract is as much an unlawful threat as a threat of violence. The case is also the leading authority on the categories of exemplary damages.
Intimidation may be two-party (threatening the plaintiff himself) or three-party (as in Rookes). The essentials: an unlawful threat, intention to injure the plaintiff, compliance by the person threatened, and resulting damage.
6. Conspiracy
Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to injure the plaintiff, carried out, causing him damage. There are two kinds:
- Lawful-means conspiracy. The acts done are lawful in themselves, but the predominant purpose of the combination is to injure the plaintiff rather than to protect the conspirators' own interests. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901), union officials, wanting a butcher (Leathem) to dismiss non-union workers, persuaded his main customer to stop buying from him by threatening to call out the customer's own workers. The House of Lords held them liable: the combination had been formed to injure Leathem.
- Unlawful-means conspiracy. The conspirators use unlawful means, such as crimes or torts. Here an intention to injure is enough; it need not be the predominant purpose.
Where the predominant purpose is to advance a legitimate interest, there is no liability even if the plaintiff is harmed. In Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch (1942), dockers' union officials put an embargo on yarn imported to the Isle of Lewis, to help local mills that employed union members and paid better wages. The House of Lords held that the predominant purpose was to protect the members' interests, not to injure the plaintiffs, so there was no conspiracy. Read with Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1892), which allowed a combination of shipowners to drive out a competitor by price-cutting, the rule is that self-interest is a lawful purpose.
7. Problem
X Ltd. employs a star salesman, S, on a three-year exclusive contract. Y Ltd., a rival, knowing of the contract, offers S double the pay to join at once. S leaves in the second year. X Ltd. loses major orders.
Issue. Whether Y Ltd. is liable to X Ltd. in tort.
Law. A person who knowingly and intentionally induces a breach of a subsisting contract, causing damage, is liable (Lumley v. Gye). Commercial advantage is not justification.
Application. The contract was valid and subsisting; Y Ltd. knew of it; the offer was made to get S to leave at once, so breach was the intended means; S broke the contract; X Ltd. lost orders. Y Ltd.'s motive of profit does not justify the inducement.
Conclusion. Y Ltd. is liable to X Ltd. for inducing breach of contract, in addition to S's own liability in contract.
How this is examined
Usually short notes: “Inducement of breach of contract”, “Conspiracy”, “Intimidation” or “Interference with marital rights”. For a 10-mark question on torts affecting family relations, cover the three domestic actions with their decline, then show Lumley v. Gye as the bridge to the economic torts. For conspiracy, always contrast Quinn v. Leathem with Crofter v. Veitch.
Now try the real questions: Law of Torts past question papers.