Subordinate judiciary and administrative tribunals

1. The subordinate courts: Articles 233 to 237

• Article 233 — district judges. Appointment, posting and promotion of district judges are made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. A person not already in the service of the Union or State is eligible only if he has been an advocate or pleader for at least seven years and is recommended by the High Court.
• Article 233A. Inserted by the Twentieth Amendment, 1966 to validate district judge appointments made otherwise than in accordance with Article 233, after the Chandra Mohan decision.
• Article 234 — other judicial officers. Appointed by the Governor under rules made after consulting the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
• Article 235 — control. Control over district courts and courts subordinate to them, including posting, promotion and leave of persons in the judicial service below the rank of district judge, is vested in the High Court. This covers disciplinary control, though the formal order of dismissal is made by the Governor on the High Court's recommendation.
• Article 236 — definitions. “District judge” includes judges of city civil courts, additional and assistant district judges, chief judges of small cause courts, chief presidency magistrates and sessions judges. “Judicial service” means a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to it.
• Article 237. The Governor may by notification apply these provisions to any class of magistrates.

Read these with Article 50, which directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services. Articles 233 to 237 are the machinery that makes that directive real at the district level.

2. Chandra Mohan (1966)

Uttar Pradesh rules provided for recruitment of district judges from among executive officers exercising judicial functions, through a selection committee that included executive officials. In Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1966 INSC 133, AIR 1966 SC 1987, the Constitution Bench held the appointments invalid. The Governor can appoint a district judge only from two sources: the judicial service, and advocates or pleaders recommended by the High Court. “Service” in Article 233 means judicial service, and consultation with the High Court cannot be replaced by a committee of the executive's choosing. Parliament responded with Article 233A to save the appointments already made, but the principle stands.

3. The All India Judges Association cases

This is a single petition filed in 1989 that has produced directions for more than three decades.

• All India Judges' Association v. Union of India, 1991 INSC 290, (1992) 1 SCC 119: directions for an All India Judicial Service, uniform designations, a retirement age of sixty, residential accommodation, libraries and vehicles for judicial officers.
• All India Judges' Association v. Union of India, 1993 INSC 272, (1993) 4 SCC 288: on review, the Court explained that judges are not employees of the State in the ordinary sense, and that their service conditions must be determined separately from the executive services. Retirement at sixty was retained, subject to assessment at fifty-eight. This led to the First National Judicial Pay Commission (the Shetty Commission).
• All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2002 INSC 165, (2002) 4 SCC 247: the Shetty Commission's recommendations largely accepted, and a recruitment pattern for the higher judicial service laid down — promotion on merit-cum-seniority, promotion by limited competitive examination, and direct recruitment from the Bar.
• All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 735: the limited departmental competitive examination quota for promotion to the higher judicial service restored to twenty-five per cent, and a minimum of three years' practice at the Bar restored as a condition for entry as civil judge (junior division).

4. Tribunals: Articles 323A and 323B

The Forty-second Amendment, 1976 inserted Part XIV-A to relieve the High Courts of their arrears.

• Article 323A. Parliament may by law provide for administrative tribunals for disputes about recruitment and conditions of service of public servants. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 set up the Central Administrative Tribunal and State tribunals.
• Article 323B. The appropriate legislature may set up tribunals for listed matters: taxation, foreign exchange, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms, ceiling on urban property, elections to legislatures, essential supplies, rent and tenancy, and offences under laws on these matters.
• Clauses 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d) allowed the law to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136.

5. From Sampath Kumar to L. Chandra Kumar

In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, 1986 INSC 259, (1987) 1 SCC 124, the Court upheld the exclusion of the High Courts on the footing that the tribunal was an equally effective substitute. Judicial review is part of the basic structure, but it can be vested in an alternative institutional mechanism, provided that mechanism is as effective as the High Court. The Court required changes in the composition of the tribunal to secure that.

Experience did not bear out the “effective substitute” theory. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997 INSC 288, (1997) 3 SCC 261, a seven-judge Bench held:

• The power of judicial review of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 is part of the basic structure and cannot be excluded.
• Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d), and the exclusion clauses in the statutes, are unconstitutional to that extent.
• Tribunals remain courts of first instance, and may even test the validity of statutes (except their own parent statute), but their decisions are subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the High Court in whose jurisdiction the tribunal falls. Tribunals supplement the High Courts; they do not supplant them.

6. The Madras Bar Association line

Once review by the High Court was secured, the fight moved to who sits on tribunals and for how long.

• Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, 2010 INSC 305, (2010) 11 SCC 1: Parliament may transfer jurisdiction to tribunals, but a tribunal replacing a court must have the independence and judicial character of the court it replaces. Provisions on the National Company Law Tribunal were corrected accordingly.
• Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2014 INSC 685, (2014) 10 SCC 1: the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 was struck down. The core function of the High Court, deciding substantial questions of law in tax appeals, could not be given to a body lacking judicial independence.
• Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2020 INSC 666: on the Tribunal Rules of 2020, the Court directed a five-year tenure, eligibility of advocates with ten years' practice, a casting vote for the Chief Justice's nominee in the selection committee, and a National Tribunals Commission.
• Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2021 INSC 332: the Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021 re-imposed a four-year tenure and a minimum age of fifty. The Court struck those provisions down as an attempt to override its directions without curing the defect. Parliament re-enacted them in the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021.
• Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330: the Court struck down the provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 that repeated what had been invalidated in 2021, holding that a legislature cannot simply re-enact a provision declared unconstitutional without removing its basis, and directed the Union to establish a National Tribunals Commission.

How this is examined

Subordinate judiciary comes as a short note on Articles 233 to 235 and High Court control; Chandra Mohan is the case to name. Tribunals come as a short note on Article 323A or as part of an essay on judicial review as basic structure.

For tribunals, the answer is a sequence: the 1976 amendment and its exclusion clauses, Sampath Kumar's effective-substitute theory, its rejection in L. Chandra Kumar, then the Madras Bar Association cases on independence, ending with the 2025 judgment on the Tribunals Reforms Act.