Sources of Muslim law

1. The Quran

The Quran is the word of God revealed to the Prophet over about twenty-three years and is the first and supreme source. It has 114 chapters (suras). Only a small part of it, usually put at a few hundred verses, lays down legal rules, but those verses cover the matters this subject is about: marriage and the limit of four wives, dower, divorce and iddat, inheritance shares, and bequests. Nothing in the other sources can override a clear Quranic text.

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 INSC 785, (2017) 9 SCC 1, Joseph J. held that a practice contrary to the Quran cannot be good in Shariat, and so found instant triple talaq bad; Nariman and Lalit JJ. held it manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. Use it to show the Quran's primacy over later practice.

2. The Sunna and the Hadith

The Sunna is the practice of the Prophet; a Hadith is the report of it. It is of three kinds:

• sunnat-ul-qaul: what the Prophet said;
• sunnat-ul-fail: what he did;
• sunnat-ul-taqrir: what was done in his presence without his disapproval.

Traditions are graded by the reliability of their chain of narrators (isnad): mutawatir (narrated by so many from the start that falsehood is excluded), mashhur (well known) and ahad (isolated). The six Sunni collections, of which Bukhari and Muslim are the most respected, are called the Sihah Sitta. Shias accept only traditions coming through the Prophet's family. The Sunna explains and supplements the Quran but cannot contradict it.

3. Ijma

Ijma is the consensus of the qualified jurists (mujtahids) of a particular period on a question of law. Its authority rests on the tradition that the community will never agree upon an error. Writers describe three kinds: the consensus of the Companions of the Prophet (most authoritative), the consensus of the jurists, and the consensus of the people. Once formed, an ijma binds later generations unless reversed by a later ijma. Shias accept ijma only when it includes the Imam's opinion.

4. Qiyas

Qiyas is analogical deduction: a rule laid down in the texts for one case is extended to a new case sharing the same reason (illat). The standard example is wine: the Quran forbids it because it intoxicates, so other intoxicants are forbidden by analogy. Qiyas does not create new law; it discovers the law already contained in the texts. Hanafis use it freely and supplement it with istihsan (juristic preference), Malikis with istislah (public interest). Shias reject qiyas and rely on aql (reason).

5. Secondary sources

• Custom (urf). Islamic law recognised custom that did not conflict with the texts. In India, custom had displaced Muslim law in many communities: Khojas and Cutchi Memons followed Hindu rules of succession, and Mappillas of Malabar followed matriliny. To be valid a custom had to be ancient, certain, reasonable and not opposed to public policy. The Shariat Act 1937 abolished custom in the matters listed in section 2, so custom now survives only outside those matters, chiefly agricultural land.
• Judicial decisions. Decisions of the Privy Council, the High Courts and the Supreme Court bind under the doctrine of precedent and form much of Anglo-Muhammadan law: the nature of marriage and dower in Abdul Kadir v. Salima (Allahabad, 1886), the widow's right of retention in Maina Bibi v. Chaudhri Vakil Ahmad (Privy Council, 1925), and the invalidity of instant talaq in Shayara Bano.
• Legislation. The Shariat Act 1937; the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939; the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986; the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019; the Waqf Act 1995 (now renamed by the 2025 amendment); and general laws that apply to Muslims, such as the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 and section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
• Justice, equity and good conscience. Where personal law was silent, the British courts were directed by the Regulations to decide according to justice, equity and good conscience, which in practice meant English rules suited to Indian conditions. Judges of Muslim law also applied the jurists' own equitable devices such as istihsan.

6. The Shariat Act 1937, section 2

Section 2 provides that, notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding:

• intestate succession;
• special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of personal law;
• marriage, and dissolution of marriage including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat;
• maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties; and
• wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments),

the rule of decision, where the parties are Muslims, shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).

Three points follow. First, the section is mandatory: in these matters custom is excluded for every Muslim. Second, agricultural land is left out because succession to it was a State subject; several States later extended the Act to agricultural land by amendment. Third, adoption, wills and legacies are not in section 2. Under section 3 a Muslim may, by a declaration before the prescribed authority, opt to be governed by the Shariat in those matters too; until he does, custom on them may continue to apply.

How this is examined

The January 2026 paper set “Explain the sources of Mohammedan law” for 10 marks, and it appears in most papers in some form. The answer runs: a two-line introduction on Shariat and fiqh; the Quran (with one Quranic rule as an example and Shayara Bano); the Sunna and its three kinds; ijma and its kinds; qiyas with the wine example and the Shia rejection of it; then custom, judicial decisions, legislation and justice, equity and good conscience; and a final paragraph on section 2 of the 1937 Act, listing the matters it covers and the exclusion of agricultural land. Short notes are set on ijma, qiyas, or the Shariat Act alone.