Judicial independence and judicial accountability
Judicial and Legislative Process · Unit III · Topic 9 of 20 · 5 min read
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Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.
Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.
The examinable core. The August 2024 paper asked for the
interrelationship between independence and accountability. The answer is that
independence is the condition of impartial judging and accountability is the condition of
public trust in it; each, pushed too far, defeats the other. Independence without accountability
becomes unchecked power; accountability to the executive destroys independence. The design
question is to whom and for what judges answer.
1. Two meanings of independence
- Institutional (collective) independence — the judiciary as a branch free from control by the executive and legislature in appointments, tenure, finance and administration.
- Decisional (individual) independence — each judge free to decide on the law and evidence without pressure, including pressure from within the judiciary.
International statements: the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985); the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), whose six values are independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, and competence and diligence. In India the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life in 1997.
2. Constitutional safeguards in India
- Appointment by the President after consultation with the judiciary (Articles 124(2), 217).
- Security of tenure — removal only by an address of both Houses on proved misbehaviour or incapacity, supported by a special majority (Article 124(4), (5); Article 218 for High Courts), with the procedure in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
- Salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund and not to be varied to a judge’s disadvantage after appointment, except in a financial emergency (Article 125).
- Bar on discussion of a judge’s conduct in Parliament or a State Legislature except on a removal motion (Articles 121, 211).
- Bar on practice after retirement (Article 124(7)).
- Contempt power (Articles 129, 215).
- Separation from the executive in the public services of the State (Article 50).
3. Appointments: the Judges cases and NJAC
- First Judges case: S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 INSC 209. “Consultation” with the Chief Justice did not mean concurrence; the executive had primacy.
- Second Judges case: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993 INSC 318, (1993) 4 SCC 441. Overruled S.P. Gupta; gave primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice of India formed in consultation with senior judges — the origin of the collegium.
- Third Judges case: In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, 1998 INSC 402, (1998) 7 SCC 739. The collegium for Supreme Court appointments is the Chief Justice and the four senior-most puisne judges.
- NJAC. The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 replaced the collegium with a six-member commission including the Law Minister and two eminent persons. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 (16 October 2015), a Constitution Bench struck both down by four to one as violating judicial independence, a basic feature. Chelameswar J. dissented, criticising the opacity of the collegium.
The paradox to state in an answer. The NJAC judgment protected independence by
keeping appointments in judicial hands, but it did so by preserving a system widely criticised
as unaccountable. The Court itself acknowledged the need to improve the collegium, and in the
follow-up order (2015 INSC 285,
16 December 2015) invited the government to finalise a revised Memorandum of Procedure. That
tension is the interrelationship the examiner wants discussed.
4. Mechanisms of accountability
- Impeachment. The only formal mechanism under the Constitution. It is cumbersome and political; no judge of a superior court has been removed by it, though motions have been moved and some judges have resigned before the vote.
- Criminal law. K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, 1991 INSC 163, (1991) 3 SCC 655: a judge of a superior court is a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, but no case may be registered without consulting the Chief Justice of India.
- In-house procedure. C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, 1995 INSC 537, (1995) 5 SCC 457, recognised a gap between bad conduct and impeachable misbehaviour, and led to the in-house procedure adopted by the Supreme Court in 1999 for complaints against judges. In 2025 that procedure was used after cash was reported found at the residence of a High Court judge; the in-house committee’s findings were followed by a removal motion in Parliament.
- Transparency. Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, 2019 INSC 1233, (2020) 5 SCC 481: the office of the Chief Justice is a public authority under the RTI Act, and information such as judges’ asset declarations can be disclosed subject to a case-by-case balancing of privacy and confidentiality.
- Reasoned and public judgments, appeal and review — the everyday form of accountability.
- Criticism. Fair criticism of judgments is not contempt; the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 allows truth as a defence in the public interest (section 13, as amended in 2006).
- Institutional reform within the judiciary: the senior designation guidelines in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India, 2017 INSC 1031, (2017) 9 SCC 766; publication of collegium resolutions; live-streaming.
The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010, which would have created a statutory oversight body and enforceable standards, lapsed with the Fifteenth Lok Sabha.
5. Comparative models
| Country | Appointment | Discipline |
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Independent Judicial Appointments Commission (Constitutional Reform Act 2005); UK Supreme Court from 2009; Lord Chancellor’s role reduced | Judicial Conduct Investigations Office; removal of senior judges by address of both Houses |
| United States | President nominates, Senate confirms; tenure “during good behaviour” (Article III) | Impeachment; judicial councils for lower federal judges |
| India | Collegium | Impeachment; in-house procedure |
6. The interrelationship
- Accountability is a condition of independence: a judiciary that is seen as self-serving loses the public support that protects it from executive attack.
- The forum matters: accountability to the executive or to the political majority threatens independence; accountability through reasons, peer review, transparency and law does not.
- Decisional independence is absolute: no judge answers for the content of a decision except through appeal. Conduct is a different matter, and here accountability must be real.
- The Indian experiment of self-appointment maximises institutional independence but leaves a gap in accountability; most reform proposals (a revised Memorandum of Procedure, a secretariat, published criteria) aim at that gap without returning to executive primacy.
How this is examined
The August 2024 paper (Q.3) set this exact question. Define both terms, give the constitutional safeguards, trace the Judges cases to NJAC, list accountability mechanisms with one case each (Veeraswami, Ravichandran Iyer, Subhash Chandra Agarwal), add the UK and US models, and end with the four-point interrelationship above.
Now try the real questions: Judicial and Legislative Process past question papers.