Coalition government, defections and the nexus of politics, crime and business
Indian Constitutional Law - New Challenges · Unit V · Topic 21 of 21 · 6 min read
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Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.
Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.
1. Coalitions and the parliamentary system
Single-party majorities were the rule until 1977. The Janata government (1977–79), the minority and coalition governments of 1989–99, the coalitions led by the BJP and the Congress from 1998 to 2014, and the coalition government formed after the 2024 election have made coalition a normal form of Indian government. The Constitution says little about it. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, and Article 164(2) does the same for State Assemblies; everything else is convention, Governors’ practice and case law.
- Formation. The Sarkaria Commission set an order of preference for a hung House: a pre-poll alliance, then the largest single party able to command support, then a post-poll coalition. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, 2006 INSC 42, the Court held that a Governor cannot refuse a post-poll coalition on speculation that its majority was obtained by inducements.
- The floor test. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 INSC 111 made the floor of the House the place to test a majority. Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 2020 INSC 335: a Governor may call for a floor test when there is objective material suggesting that the government has lost its majority, even while the House is in session. In Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 INSC 516, the Governor’s call for a floor test was held not justified by the material before him, though the Court could not restore a Chief Minister who had resigned without facing it.
- Durability. The Vajpayee government lost a confidence vote by a single vote in 1999. Reform bodies have proposed a constructive vote of no confidence on the German model (Article 67 of the Basic Law), under which a government can be removed only if the House elects a successor at the same time.
2. The anti-defection law
The Fifty-second Amendment (1985) added the Tenth Schedule. A member is disqualified if he voluntarily gives up membership of his party or votes or abstains contrary to its direction without permission. An exception for a “split” by one-third was removed by the Ninety-first Amendment (2003), which kept only a merger supported by two-thirds of the legislature party, limited the size of the Council of Ministers to fifteen per cent of the House (Articles 75(1A) and 164(1A)), and barred a disqualified defector from ministerial office until re-elected.
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1991 INSC 287: the Schedule is valid and does not violate free speech in the House; the Speaker acts as a tribunal, and paragraph 7, which barred courts, was invalid for want of State ratification. The Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review on limited grounds. The minority would have struck down the whole amendment for want of ratification, and doubted that a Speaker who depends on the majority could be an independent adjudicator.
- Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 INSC 57: giving up membership need not be by resignation; it can be inferred from conduct.
- Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, 2007 INSC 139: a Speaker who recognised a claimed split without deciding the pending disqualification petitions failed to exercise his jurisdiction.
- Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, 2019 INSC 1237: resignation does not avoid disqualification, but the Speaker cannot bar a disqualified member from contesting for the rest of the term.
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, 2020 INSC 65: disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months, and Parliament should consider an independent tribunal in place of the Speaker.
- Subhash Desai (2023): the whip is appointed by the political party, not the legislature party; in a faction dispute the Speaker must look to the party’s constitution and structure, not merely to numbers in the House.
3. Corrupt practice: bribery of legislators
In P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State, 1998 INSC 185, a majority held that members who took bribes and voted to defeat a no-confidence motion were immune from prosecution under Article 105(2), while a member who took a bribe but did not vote was not. A seven-judge Bench overruled it in Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 161: parliamentary privilege protects speech and votes necessary to the functioning of the House, and bribery is complete when the bribe is accepted, whatever the vote. Outside the House, section 123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 lists corrupt practices in elections, including bribery and undue influence.
4. The nexus of politics with crime and business
- Crime. The Vohra Committee (1993) reported a nexus between criminal gangs, politicians and officials. The judicial response has been disclosure and speed: candidates must declare criminal antecedents (see the previous note), and in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 991, High Courts were directed to monitor criminal cases against sitting and former legislators through cases registered on their own motion. The Court has refused to add disqualification at the stage of framing of charges, which the Law Commission in its 244th Report (2014) supported with safeguards.
- Business. Corporate funding of parties, the electoral bonds scheme struck down in 2024 for anonymity and quid pro quo, and unregulated lobbying are the business side. India has no law on lobbying and no cap on party expenditure.
5. Grassroots democracy
The Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendments (1992) gave constitutional status to panchayats and municipalities, with reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, State Election Commissions and State Finance Commissions. Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, 2006 INSC 713, held that elections must be held before the term expires, and K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India, 2010 INSC 307, upheld backward-class reservation in local bodies within a fifty per cent ceiling. The constitutional weakness is that devolution of functions, funds and functionaries remains in the State legislature’s discretion; grassroots democracy is guaranteed in form more than in power.
How this is examined
Essays: “coalition government and constitutional conventions”; “the anti-defection law: an evaluation”; “criminalisation of politics”. Short notes: the Tenth Schedule, the floor test, Sita Soren, the Vohra Committee, the role of the Speaker. Use the case sequence in section 2 and one comparative point; for a problem on a Governor in a hung Assembly, apply section 1 in order.
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