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Coalition government, defections and the nexus of politics, crime and business

Indian Constitutional Law - New Challenges · Unit V · Topic 21 of 21 · 6 min read

Stability of coalition and minority governments, the Governor and the floor test, the Tenth Schedule from Kihoto Hollohan to Subhash Desai, bribery of legislators after Sita Soren, the Vohra Committee's nexus, and grassroots democracy under Parts IX and IXA.

On this page
  1. 1. Coalitions and the parliamentary system
  2. 2. The anti-defection law
  3. 3. Corrupt practice: bribery of legislators
  4. 4. The nexus of politics with crime and business
  5. 5. Grassroots democracy
  6. How this is examined
Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.

Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.

The examinable core. The last item in the syllabus groups the democratic process, coalition government (“stability, durability and corrupt practice”), the nexus of politics with crime and business, and grassroots democracy. Electoral reform and the Election Commission are in the previous note. Here the theme is how the Constitution keeps a government stable and honest when no party has a majority, and what the courts have done when legislators change sides for office or money.

1. Coalitions and the parliamentary system

Single-party majorities were the rule until 1977. The Janata government (1977–79), the minority and coalition governments of 1989–99, the coalitions led by the BJP and the Congress from 1998 to 2014, and the coalition government formed after the 2024 election have made coalition a normal form of Indian government. The Constitution says little about it. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, and Article 164(2) does the same for State Assemblies; everything else is convention, Governors’ practice and case law.

2. The anti-defection law

The Fifty-second Amendment (1985) added the Tenth Schedule. A member is disqualified if he voluntarily gives up membership of his party or votes or abstains contrary to its direction without permission. An exception for a “split” by one-third was removed by the Ninety-first Amendment (2003), which kept only a merger supported by two-thirds of the legislature party, limited the size of the Council of Ministers to fifteen per cent of the House (Articles 75(1A) and 164(1A)), and barred a disqualified defector from ministerial office until re-elected.

Has the Tenth Schedule worked? It ended individual floor-crossing for office but moved defection to groups (mergers engineered to reach two-thirds), resignations timed to bring down governments, and Speakers who delay petitions until the result is settled. It also weakened the individual member, who can no longer vote by conscience on any question, which critics say turns legislators into delegates of party leaders. The United Kingdom has no such law; members cross the floor and face their voters. Proposals include confining the whip to confidence and money votes and transferring decisions to the Election Commission or a tribunal.

3. Corrupt practice: bribery of legislators

In P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State, 1998 INSC 185, a majority held that members who took bribes and voted to defeat a no-confidence motion were immune from prosecution under Article 105(2), while a member who took a bribe but did not vote was not. A seven-judge Bench overruled it in Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 161: parliamentary privilege protects speech and votes necessary to the functioning of the House, and bribery is complete when the bribe is accepted, whatever the vote. Outside the House, section 123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 lists corrupt practices in elections, including bribery and undue influence.

4. The nexus of politics with crime and business

5. Grassroots democracy

The Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendments (1992) gave constitutional status to panchayats and municipalities, with reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, State Election Commissions and State Finance Commissions. Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, 2006 INSC 713, held that elections must be held before the term expires, and K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India, 2010 INSC 307, upheld backward-class reservation in local bodies within a fifty per cent ceiling. The constitutional weakness is that devolution of functions, funds and functionaries remains in the State legislature’s discretion; grassroots democracy is guaranteed in form more than in power.

How this is examined

Essays: “coalition government and constitutional conventions”; “the anti-defection law: an evaluation”; “criminalisation of politics”. Short notes: the Tenth Schedule, the floor test, Sita Soren, the Vohra Committee, the role of the Speaker. Use the case sequence in section 2 and one comparative point; for a problem on a Governor in a hung Assembly, apply section 1 in order.

Now try the real questions: Indian Constitutional Law - New Challenges past question papers.