Limitation Act, 1963: salient features, bar of limitation, condonation of delay and legal disability

1. Scheme and salient features of the Act

• Consolidating and amending Act. The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) replaced the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and came into force on 1 January 1964. It extends to the whole of India; the exclusion of Jammu and Kashmir was removed in 2019.
• Structure. Thirty-two sections in five Parts (preliminary; limitation of suits, appeals and applications; computation of the period; acquisition of ownership by possession; miscellaneous), and a Schedule of 137 articles in three Divisions: suits (Articles 1 to 113), appeals (114 to 117) and applications (118 to 137). Each article gives the description of the proceeding, the period, and the time from which it runs.
• Residuary articles. Article 113 gives three years for any suit not otherwise provided for, from when the right to sue accrues; Article 137 gives three years for any other application.
• Procedural, but with substantive provisions. The Act is mainly procedural and applies as it stands on the date the proceeding is filed. But sections 25 to 27 are substantive: section 25 creates easements by prescription and section 27 extinguishes title.
• Applies to courts. The Act governs suits, appeals and applications in courts. Where a special or local law prescribes a different period, section 3 applies to that period and sections 4 to 24 apply unless the special law expressly excludes them (section 29(2)). It does not apply to suits under marriage and divorce laws unless those laws say so (section 29(3)).
• Other features. Definitions of “applicant”, “good faith” (nothing is in good faith which is not done with due care and attention) and “period of limitation” in section 2; section 5 available for any appeal or application except under Order XXI; a child in the womb treated as a minor (Explanation to section 6); set-off and counter-claim treated as separate suits (section 3(2)(b)); and thirty years for suits by the Government (Article 112).

2. Bar of limitation (section 3)

Subject to sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence (section 3(1)). The court must examine limitation on its own; the defendant cannot waive it, and parties cannot extend it by agreement. In Noharlal Verma v. District Co-operative Central Bank, 2008 INSC 1183, (2008) 14 SCC 445, the Court said that section 3 casts a duty on the court to dismiss a time-barred proceeding even if the opposite party does not raise the objection.

Section 3(2) tells us when a proceeding is instituted: a suit when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; for an indigent person, when his application to sue is made; a claim against a company in liquidation, when the claim is first sent to the official liquidator. A set-off is treated as instituted on the date of the suit; a counter-claim on the date it is made in court.

3. Limitation bars the remedy, not the right

Section 3 does not destroy the right; it only bars the remedy by suit. The debt survives. In Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. v. State of Bombay, 1957 INSC 116, AIR 1958 SC 328, the Court held that the law of limitation bars the remedy and does not extinguish the debt, which may therefore be recovered by other lawful means. Consequences:

• a debtor who pays a time-barred debt cannot recover it back;
• a creditor holding security, a lien or a right of set-off outside the suit may use it: in Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1992 INSC 109, the Court held a bank entitled to adjust a time-barred debt against a fixed deposit of the guarantor held by it, and quashed a criminal complaint against the bank's officers;
• a written promise to pay a time-barred debt is a valid contract under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which section 29(1) of the Limitation Act expressly saves;
• a creditor may appropriate a payment to a time-barred debt under section 60 of the Contract Act.

The exception is section 27: for suits for possession of property, the expiry of the period extinguishes the right itself (see the note on adverse possession).

4. Court closed on the last day (section 4)

Where the prescribed period for a suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, it may be filed on the day the court reopens. A court is deemed closed if it remains closed during any part of its normal working hours (Explanation). Section 4 applies only to the prescribed period under the Schedule, not to a further period that a court may allow by condonation. It is not an extension of time: the filing on the reopening day is simply treated as in time.

5. Condonation of delay (section 5)

Scope. Any appeal or any application, other than an application under Order XXI of the Code, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not filing within time. Section 5 does not apply to suits; nor to execution applications under Order XXI. Being misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court in computing the period may be sufficient cause (Explanation).

Sufficient cause: the leading cases.

• Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, 1987 INSC 54, (1987) 2 SCC 107: a liberal, justice-oriented approach. Ordinarily a litigant does not benefit by filing late; refusing condonation may shut out a meritorious case; every day's delay need not be explained in a pedantic way; when technical considerations and substantial justice conflict, substantial justice is preferred; and the State is not to be treated worse than a private party.
• N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 INSC 345, (1998) 7 SCC 123: the length of delay is not the test; the acceptability of the explanation is. A short delay may be refused if unexplained, a long one condoned if satisfactorily explained.
• Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., 2012 INSC 105, (2012) 3 SCC 563: government departments must explain delay with acceptable reasons; the usual excuse of bureaucratic procedure and file movement is not sufficient cause, and condonation is not an anticipated benefit for them.
• Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, 2013 INSC 620, (2013) 12 SCC 649: the Court collected the principles. Liberal approach, but not to the point of ignoring the other side's vested right; distinction between inordinate and short delay; negligence, want of bona fides or a casual approach disentitles the applicant; the conduct of both parties is relevant.

Typical sufficient causes: illness of the party or counsel, mistake of counsel, wrong legal advice, bona fide pursuit of a wrong remedy, imprisonment, and delay in obtaining certified copies. An application under section 5 must be supported by an affidavit; in appeals, Order XLI rule 3A requires it to accompany the memorandum.

6. Legal disability (sections 6 to 8)

Section 6. Where the person entitled to sue or to apply for execution is, at the time from which the period is to be reckoned, a minor, insane or an idiot, he may sue within the same period after the disability ceases as would have been allowed from the time specified in the Schedule (sub-section (1)). Further rules:

• two disabilities at the start, or a second disability arising before the first ceases: time runs after both cease (sub-section (2));
• disability continuing till death: his legal representative gets the same period from the death (sub-section (3)); if the legal representative is himself under disability, sub-sections (1) and (2) apply to him (sub-section (4));
• death after the disability ceases but within the extended period: the legal representative gets the period that would have been available (sub-section (5));
• a child in the womb is a minor (Explanation).

Section 7. Where one of several persons jointly entitled is under disability, time runs against all if a valid discharge can be given without his concurrence; otherwise it does not run against any of them until one becomes capable of giving a discharge or the disability ends. The karta of a Mitakshara family in management of the joint property can give such a discharge.

Section 8. Sections 6 and 7 do not apply to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, and the extension can never exceed three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected.

The disability must exist when the cause of action arises. A disability that arises later does not help, because of section 9.

7. Continuous running of time (section 9)

Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. If A's cause of action arises when he is sane, and he becomes insane a year later, time keeps running. The only exception in the section: where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor are granted to his debtor, time for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues. Sections 12 to 15 and 18 to 19 operate differently: they exclude time or start a fresh period, rather than stopping the clock.

8. Problem

The last day of limitation for Vijay's (or Srikant's) suit falls on a court holiday. He seeks extension of the period on that ground. Will he succeed?

Issue. Whether the suit filed on the reopening day is within time, and whether an “extension” is needed.

Law. Section 4 permits a suit to be instituted on the day the court reopens where the prescribed period expires on a day the court is closed. Section 5 does not apply to suits at all.

Application. Vijay does not need, and cannot get, an extension under section 5, since his proceeding is a suit. He does not need one either: if he presents the plaint on the first day the court reopens, section 4 treats it as filed in time. If the court was closed for only part of its working hours on the last day, the Explanation still treats it as closed.

Conclusion. His request for extension will be refused as unnecessary, but the suit, if filed on the reopening day, is within limitation. If he files later than that, the suit is barred and section 3 requires dismissal.

How this is examined

“Explain the salient features of the Limitation Act, 1963” (January 2026) uses parts 1 to 3 of this note. “Limitation extinguishes remedy but not right? Explain” (June 2025) uses part 3, with section 27 as the exception. “Explain the circumstances in which delay will be condoned” (February 2025, August 2024) and “Condonation of delay” (January 2026, June 2025) use part 5. “Discuss the effect of legal disabilities” (January 2026, August 2024) uses part 6, and “Once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability can stop it” (February 2025) uses part 7 on section 9. The court-holiday problem appeared in both January 2026 and February 2025.