External aids II: dictionaries, translations, statutes in pari materia, contemporanea expositio

1. Dictionaries

Where a word is not defined in the Act, the court gives it its ordinary meaning, and a dictionary is a legitimate place to find that meaning. But dictionaries give many meanings, and they record general usage, not the sense intended in a particular statute. The court chooses the meaning that fits the context and object.

• Popular sense for everyday words. In a statute dealing with matters of everyday life, words are understood as people conversant with the subject understand them. In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, 1961 INSC 88, AIR 1961 SC 1325, betel leaves were held not to be “vegetables” under a sales tax schedule, the word being understood in its common sense as things grown in a kitchen garden and used for the table.
• Wide meaning where the context requires. In CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel, 1971 INSC 196, (1971) 3 SCC 550, “plant” in the Income-tax Act, 1922 was given a wide meaning, drawn from English decisions and dictionaries, so as to include sanitary and pipeline fittings installed in a hotel.
• Context over dictionary. In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, 1964 INSC 164, AIR 1965 SC 871, “abandoned” cattle in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 was not given the dictionary sense of cattle whose owner had given up ownership, but the sense of cattle left loose and unattended, which was the mischief the provision targeted.
• Technical words are given their technical meaning, and legal terms their legal meaning, unless the context shows otherwise.

2. Translations

Indian statutes exist in more than one language, so the question arises which text governs. Under Article 348(1)(b) the authoritative texts of Central and State Acts, Ordinances and subordinate legislation are in English. Under Article 348(3), where a State Legislature passes its Bills in another language (Kannada in Karnataka, for instance), the English translation published under the authority of the Governor is deemed the authoritative English text. The Authoritative Texts (Central Laws) Act, 1973 provides for authoritative Hindi translations of Central Acts. Where a translation and the authoritative text differ, the authoritative text prevails; where both are authoritative, the court reads each in the light of the other to find the common meaning.

3. Statutes in pari materia

Statutes are in pari materia when they deal with the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose. They are read together as forming one system, and they explain each other. A word used in one may be given the meaning it has in the other, and a doubt in one may be resolved by the other.

• State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, 1957 INSC 80, AIR 1958 SC 61. Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 provided that on proof of acceptance of gratification the court “shall presume” that it was accepted as a bribe. The Court construed “shall presume” in the sense given by section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the two Acts being in pari materia: the presumption is mandatory, and it is for the accused to rebut it. The High Court's acquittal of an Income-tax Officer who claimed the money was a loan was set aside.
• State of Bihar v. S.K. Roy, 1966 INSC 112, AIR 1966 SC 1995. “Employer” in the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 was construed by reference to the definition of “owner” of a coal mine in the Mines Act, 1952, the two Acts dealing with the same subject.

Limits: the rule applies only where the statutes really deal with the same subject; a definition in one Act is not imported into another merely because the same word is used; and if the later Act shows a different intention, that prevails.

4. Earlier and later statutes

Earlier statutes. The previous state of the law is always relevant to find the mischief (Heydon's rule). Where a provision has been repealed and re-enacted in the same words, judicial decisions on the old words are presumed to have been accepted by the legislature. Where the words have been changed, the change suggests a change in meaning. The history of successive amendments may show the direction in which the law was moving.

Later statutes. A later Act cannot change the meaning of an earlier one except by amending it. But where the earlier Act is ambiguous, a later Act on the same subject which proceeds on a particular reading of it may be treated as a parliamentary exposition of that reading. The weight is limited: the later legislature may itself have been mistaken. A declaratory Act, passed expressly to state what the earlier law meant, is different; it binds, and it is retrospective by nature.

5. Contemporanea expositio

The maxim is contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege: a contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law. The understanding of a statute by those who applied it soon after its enactment, and long usage under it, is evidence of its meaning.

• Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., 1979 INSC 50, (1979) 4 SCC 565: the Court held that the maxim can be invoked to construe a document or an old statute, and that the manner in which the authorities and the parties understood and acted on it soon after it was made is a legitimate aid, though not conclusive.
• K.P. Varghese (1981) used the Central Board of Direct Taxes' circulars, issued soon after the provision was enacted, as a contemporaneous exposition supporting its reading of section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
• The limit. In Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxmi Narayan Chopra, 1961 INSC 240, AIR 1962 SC 159, the Court declined to confine “telegraph line” in the Electricity Act, 1910 to what was understood in 1910, and held that it includes wires of a wireless telegraph station. In a fast-changing world, the maxim cannot be used to freeze the meaning of a modern statute; the words are applied to new technology within their natural sense.
• Executive practice cannot override clear words. An erroneous practice, however long, does not change the law.

6. Foreign decisions and international law

Much Indian law derives from English law, and English and Commonwealth decisions on similar provisions are persuasive. They are used with caution: the text may differ, the social conditions differ, and the Indian Constitution has no exact counterpart. For the Constitution, American and other decisions have been used for general principles. International conventions ratified by India may be read into domestic law where there is no inconsistency and there is a gap: in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, 1997 INSC 604, (1997) 6 SCC 241, the Court drew on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to frame guidelines on sexual harassment at the workplace.

How this is examined

For the pari materia essay: definition, rationale (one system of law), Vaidyanatha Iyer and S.K. Roy, then the limits. For earlier and later statutes: Heydon's rule, re-enactment in the same words, change of language, parliamentary exposition and declaratory Acts. For the 6-mark notes: the maxim with Desh Bandhu Gupta and its limit in Laxmi Narayan Chopra; dictionaries with Ramavatar and Kanwar Singh.