Central Vigilance Commission, parliamentary committees and commissions of inquiry

1. The Central Vigilance Commission

Origin. The Committee on Prevention of Corruption (the Santhanam Committee, 1964) recommended a vigilance body, and the Central Vigilance Commission was set up by a Government of India resolution in 1964. It had no statutory basis until the Supreme Court intervened. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1997 INSC 826, (1998) 1 SCC 226, a public interest case arising out of the failure of the CBI to investigate the “Jain hawala” diaries, the Court directed that the CVC be given statutory status, that it be made responsible for the efficient functioning of the CBI, and that the CBI Director have a minimum tenure. An ordinance in 1998, a resolution in 1999 and finally the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 followed.

Main provisions of the Act of 2003.

• Composition (section 3): a Central Vigilance Commissioner as Chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners.
• Appointment (section 4): by the President by warrant, on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister (chair), the Minister of Home Affairs and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (or the leader of the single largest opposition group where there is no recognised Leader of the Opposition).
• Term (section 5): four years or until the age of sixty-five, whichever is earlier. The Central Vigilance Commissioner is not eligible for reappointment.
• Removal (section 6): only by the President on proved misbehaviour or incapacity after an inquiry by the Supreme Court on a reference by the President, or for insolvency, conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, outside paid employment and similar grounds.
• Functions (section 8): superintendence over the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI) in the investigation of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and power to give it directions, without directing it to investigate a particular case in a particular way; inquiring into complaints against specified public servants; reviewing the progress of investigations and of applications for sanction to prosecute; and superintendence over the vigilance administration of ministries and public undertakings.

Integrity of the appointee. In Centre for PIL v. Union of India, 2011 INSC 175, (2011) 4 SCC 1, the appointment of P.J. Thomas as Central Vigilance Commissioner was quashed because the committee had not considered that a criminal case was pending against him. The Court held that the committee must consider the institutional integrity of the CVC as well as the personal integrity of the candidate, and that a recommendation made without considering relevant material is open to judicial review.

Assessment. The CVC's advice is not binding on the department; it has no prosecuting power of its own; and it depends on vigilance officers who are part of the departments they watch. Its value lies in its independence of appointment and in its supervision of the CBI.

2. Parliamentary committees

Parliament cannot examine the detail of administration on the floor of the House, so it works through committees. June 2025 set this as a 6-mark note. The principal committees:

• Public Accounts Committee. Examines the accounts showing how money voted by Parliament was spent, on the basis of the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General. It looks for irregularity, waste and extravagance. Traditionally chaired by a member of the Opposition. Members from both Houses.
• Estimates Committee. A Lok Sabha committee that examines the estimates of ministries and suggests economies, improvements in organisation and alternative policies. It is sometimes called the continuous economy committee.
• Committee on Public Undertakings (1964). Examines the reports and accounts of public undertakings and whether they are run efficiently and on sound business principles (see the note on Public corporations).
• Committees on Subordinate Legislation of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. Examine whether rules made under statutes are within the delegated power (see the note on Control of delegated legislation).
• Committee on Government Assurances. Checks whether promises made by Ministers on the floor of the House have been carried out.
• Departmentally Related Standing Committees (from 1993). Examine the demands for grants, Bills referred to them, and the annual reports and policies of the ministries they cover.
• Joint Parliamentary Committees, set up ad hoc to examine a particular Bill or scandal.

Effectiveness. The committees work in private, away from party confrontation, and their reports are often unanimous. They have the power to call for records and summon officials. Their weakness is that their recommendations are not binding and their reports come long after the event, and the Government's action-taken replies are frequently formal.

3. Commissions of inquiry

The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 provides for fact-finding commissions.

• Appointment (section 3(1)). The appropriate Government may, if it thinks it necessary, and must, if a resolution is passed by each House of Parliament or the State Legislature, appoint a Commission by notification to inquire into any definite matter of public importance. Where the Centre has appointed one, a State may not appoint another on the same matter without the Centre's approval; where a State has, the Centre may not appoint another unless the inquiry should extend to two or more States. Since 2014 this is subject to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.
• Members (section 3(2)). One or more, one of whom may be Chairman. Retired or sitting judges are usually appointed.
• Powers (section 4). The powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure in summoning and examining witnesses on oath, discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning public records, and issuing commissions.
• Additional powers (section 5), if the Government so notifies: requiring information, entry and search for documents, and treating the Commission as a civil court for certain offences.
• Protection of witnesses (section 6). A statement made by a person in evidence before the Commission cannot be used against him in any civil or criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence.
• Natural justice (sections 8B and 8C). A person whose conduct is to be inquired into, or whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected, must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to produce evidence; such a person may cross-examine witnesses (other than his own), address the Commission and be represented by a legal practitioner.
• Report to be laid (section 3(4)). The Government must lay the report before the House or Houses with a memorandum of the action taken within six months of its submission.

Validity and nature. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, 1958 INSC 29, AIR 1958 SC 538, the Dalmia group challenged a commission set up to inquire into the affairs of its companies. The Court upheld the Act and the notification. It held that the Commission's function is only to inquire and report; it has no power to adjudicate and its report is not enforceable, so it does not affect anyone's rights by itself. Appointing a commission to inquire into the affairs of particular persons does not violate Article 14 where there is a reasonable basis for singling them out. In State of Karnataka v. Union of India, 1977 INSC 214, (1977) 4 SCC 608, the Court upheld the Central Government's power to appoint a commission to inquire into allegations of corruption against the Chief Minister and other Ministers of Karnataka, rejecting the argument that this offended the federal structure.

4. Effect of the report

June 2025 asked about the “efficacy” of commissions and the “impact” of their reports. The legal position:

• the report is recommendatory. It is not a judgment, does not bind the Government or any court, and cannot be executed;
• the Government may accept it in whole or in part, or reject it, but it must lay it with an action taken memorandum within six months;
• findings against a person cannot by themselves be the basis of punishment; any prosecution or disciplinary action must be on fresh evidence in proceedings where the person has the usual protections, and his statements before the Commission cannot be used against him (section 6);
• the report may, however, lead to legislation, criminal investigation and changes in administration, and its public airing of facts has its own effect.

Efficacy. Commissions are useful for establishing facts after a disaster, riot or scandal, especially where sitting judges lend public confidence. The criticisms: they take years; the Government chooses whether to appoint them and what their terms of reference are; reports are often delayed in tabling or shelved; and the cost is high relative to results.

How this is examined

January 2026: “Explain the salient features of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952.” June 2025: an essay on the efficacy of inquiry commissions and the impact of their reports, and a note on parliamentary committees. A note on the CVC is set from time to time. For the Act: sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 8B, 8C and 3(4) in that order, with Ram Krishna Dalmia. For efficacy: section 4 of this note and a balanced conclusion.