Contempt of court: civil and criminal contempt

Professional Ethics · Unit III · Topic 12 of 18 · 6 min read

The constitutional source of the contempt power, the definitions of civil and criminal contempt in section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, scandalising the court and fair criticism, with the shoe-throwing advocate problem solved.

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On this page

1. Why courts punish contempt
2. Constitutional source
3. Civil contempt: section 2(b)
4. Criminal contempt: section 2(c)
5. Scandalising the court and fair criticism
6. Problem
How this is examined

Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.

Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.

A note on the title. The syllabus says “Contempt of Court Act, 1972”. The statute is the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act 70 of 1971), as the syllabus’s own reading list says. Use the correct name and year in the exam. The definitions in section 2 are the core of every contempt answer: learn them word for word.

1. Why courts punish contempt

The power exists not to protect the dignity of individual judges but to protect the administration of justice. A court whose orders can be disobeyed, or which can be freely vilified so that people lose confidence in it, cannot do justice. The Act’s long title describes it as an Act “to define and limit” the powers of courts in punishing contempt. It both recognises the power and restrains it.

2. Constitutional source

Article 129: the Supreme Court is a court of record with all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
Article 215: the same for every High Court.
Article 142(2): subject to law made by Parliament, the Supreme Court has power to punish contempt of itself.
Article 19(2): contempt of court is a ground for reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech.
Entry 77, List I and Entry 14, List III give Parliament legislative competence.

Because the power is constitutional, the Act cannot take it away; it regulates procedure and punishment. The Supreme Court’s power under Article 129 extends to contempt of subordinate courts: Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, 1991 INSC 225, (1991) 4 SCC 406, where police officers who assaulted and handcuffed the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Nadiad were punished. Section 10 of the Act gives each High Court the same power over courts subordinate to it.

3. Civil contempt: section 2(b)

“Civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court, or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.

The disobedience must be wilful: deliberate and intentional. Genuine inability to comply, or a bona fide but mistaken reading of an ambiguous order, is not contempt.
The order must be clear and must have been known to the contemnor.
An undertaking given to the court, on the faith of which the court acts, is enforceable by contempt even though it is a promise between parties.
Civil contempt is remedial: its purpose is to secure compliance. A contemnor who obeys may be discharged.

4. Criminal contempt: section 2(c)

“Criminal contempt” means the publication (by words spoken or written, by signs, by visible representation or otherwise) of any matter, or the doing of any other act whatsoever, which:

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.

Note the word “tends”. Actual harm need not be proved; a tendency is enough. But section 13 (see the next note) requires that the contempt substantially interfere, or tend substantially to interfere, with the due course of justice before a sentence can be imposed.

5. Scandalising the court and fair criticism

E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, 1970 INSC 146, AIR 1970 SC 2015. The Chief Minister of Kerala told a press conference that the judiciary was an instrument of oppression and that judges were guided by class prejudice. He defended it as Marxist political theory. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction: the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) is subject to the law of contempt, and statements that tend to bring judges into disrespect and weaken public confidence are contempt. The fine was reduced to a nominal sum.
In re Arundhati Roy, 2002 INSC 123, (2002) 3 SCC 343. Imputations against the Court in an affidavit filed in contempt proceedings were held to be criminal contempt; the Court distinguished fair criticism made in good faith and in the public interest from attacks that scandalise. She was sentenced to a symbolic one day’s imprisonment and a fine.
In re Prashant Bhushan, 2020 INSC 489. Two tweets about the Supreme Court and Chief Justices were held to be criminal contempt; the Court recognised the right of fair criticism under Article 19(1)(a) but held that the tweets crossed the line. On sentence, in In re Prashant Bhushan, 2020 INSC 522, it imposed a fine of one rupee and held that the plea of truth was neither bona fide nor in the public interest.

Section 5 allows fair comment on the merits of a case that has been heard and finally decided. The line is between criticising a judgment (permitted) and attributing motives or corruption to the judge without basis (contempt).

6. Problem

Rama, an advocate enrolled with the Karnataka State Bar Council, shouted slogans in open court and then hurled his shoe towards the judge. Is it contempt?

Law. Section 2(c)(i) and (iii): an act that scandalises or lowers the authority of the court, or obstructs the administration of justice, is criminal contempt. Section 14: where contempt is committed in the presence or hearing of the High Court, it may detain the person, inform him in writing of the charge, give him an opportunity of defence, and decide the matter the same day or as soon as possible; for a subordinate court, the matter goes to the High Court under sections 10 and 15(2). Section 12: simple imprisonment up to six months, or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both. Rules 1, 2 and 4 of the Bar Council of India Rules require dignity, respect and restraint.

Application. Shouting slogans disrupts the proceedings, and throwing a shoe at the judge is an assault on the person presiding and a gross insult to the court. Both are “acts” within section 2(c), done in the face of the court. The interference is plainly substantial within section 13. Being an advocate aggravates rather than excuses it: In re Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) held that the Bar is not exempt. It is also professional misconduct, and an assault on the judge may be a criminal offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Conclusion. It is criminal contempt in the face of the court. Rama may be punished under section 12, and a bona fide, unconditional apology may be accepted to discharge or remit the punishment. The court cannot itself suspend his licence (Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, 1998), but may refer the matter to the Karnataka State Bar Council under section 35 and may bar him from appearing before it until he purges the contempt (Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, 2001).

How this is examined

“Define criminal contempt” (2018 papers) needs the exact words of section 2(c). “What is civil contempt?” (December 2017) needs section 2(b) and the meaning of “wilful”. E.M.S. Namboodiripad was set as a short note in December 2018. The shoe-throwing problem was set in December 2017.

Now try the real questions: Professional Ethics past question papers.