Commencement, operation and repeal of statutes

1. Commencement

An Act may fix its own date of commencement, leave the date to be appointed by the Government by notification, or say nothing. Where it says nothing, section 5(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that a Central Act comes into operation on the day it receives the assent of the President (of the Governor-General, for pre-Constitution Acts). Section 5(3) adds that, unless the contrary is expressed, an Act is construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement — so it is in force for the whole of the day of commencement, from midnight.

Recent examples show the delegated pattern. The Income-tax Act, 2025 says in section 1(3) that it comes into force on 1 April 2026. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 left its commencement to notification, and the Central Government appointed 21 November 2025. Different provisions of one Act may be brought into force on different dates.

• Publication. A law binds only after it is promulgated in a way that lets people know it. In Harla v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 INSC 42, AIR 1951 SC 467, a Jaipur law that had been passed by a Council resolution but never published was held not to be in force; natural justice requires that a law be made known before people are punished under it.
• No mandamus to notify. Where Parliament leaves commencement to the executive, the court will not compel the Government to bring the Act into force: A.K. Roy v. Union of India, 1981 INSC 210, (1982) 1 SCC 271, concerning section 3 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, which had not been notified.

2. Perpetual and temporary statutes

A perpetual statute has no fixed term; it stays in force until repealed. A temporary statute is enacted for a fixed period and expires on its own at the end of it, unless extended. Ordinances are temporary by constitutional design: they cease six weeks after Parliament or the Legislature reassembles.

The difference matters on what survives. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to a repeal, not to the expiry of a temporary Act. Whether things done under a temporary Act survive its expiry is a question of construction of that Act. In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, 1961 INSC 358, AIR 1962 SC 945, the Court held that rights and liabilities of an enduring character created by a temporary law may outlast it, depending on the nature of the right and the language of the law. Legislatures avoid the problem by inserting a saving clause in the temporary Act itself.

3. Power of enactment includes power to repeal

The legislature that can make a law on a subject can unmake it, and no legislature can bind its successors by declaring an Act unrepealable. The power to repeal is part of the plenary legislative power under Articles 245 and 246. For subordinate legislation the same idea is stated in section 21 of the General Clauses Act: a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, to add to, amend, vary or rescind them. Section 14 adds that a power conferred by a Central Act may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires.

4. Express and implied repeal

Express repeal is the usual method: a repealing section or schedule names the enactments repealed (section 536 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 repeals the Income-tax Act, 1961; section 104 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 repeals the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946).

Implied repeal arises where a later Act is so inconsistent with an earlier one that both cannot stand. There is a presumption against it, because the legislature is taken to know the existing law and to say so when it means to repeal it. In Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, 1963 INSC 37, AIR 1963 SC 1561, the Court stated the tests: whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions; whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in the later law; and whether the two laws occupy the same field. A later general law does not impliedly repeal an earlier special law (generalia specialibus non derogant). In Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, 1954 INSC 85, AIR 1954 SC 752, a later Central Act on the same subject (essential supplies) was held to override the punishment provided by an earlier Bombay Act under the proviso to Article 254(2).

5. Consequences of repeal

At common law, a repealed statute was treated as if it had never existed, except for transactions past and closed. Pending proceedings fell with it. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act reverses that harsh result for Central Acts. Unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:

• (a) revive anything not in force or existing when the repeal takes effect;
• (b) affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it;
• (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under it;
• (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of an offence committed against it; or
• (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right or penalty — and these may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed.

Related sections complete the picture.

• Section 6A — repeal of an amending Act does not undo the textual amendments it has already made in the principal Act.
• Section 7 — a repealed enactment is not revived unless the reviving Act expressly states that purpose.
• Section 8 — where a provision is repealed and re-enacted, references to it in other enactments are read as references to the re-enacted provision.
• Section 24 — on repeal and re-enactment, notifications, orders, schemes, rules, forms and bye-laws made under the old Act continue, so far as consistent, as if made under the new one, until superseded.

The phrase “unless a different intention appears” matters. The repealing Act may exclude section 6, or may contain its own saving clause. Section 536 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 does the latter; section 104(3) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 expressly says that section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to the repeal.

6. Problem

A, an employer, committed an offence under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in August 2025. The Act was repealed by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 with effect from 21 November 2025. A is prosecuted in 2026 and argues that no prosecution lies under a repealed Act.

Issue. Whether a liability incurred under a repealed Act can be enforced after repeal.

Law. Section 6(d) and (e) of the General Clauses Act save penalties incurred and legal proceedings in respect of them, unless a different intention appears. Section 104(3) of the Code applies section 6 to the repeal.

Application. The offence was complete before the repeal. Far from showing a contrary intention, the Code expressly adopts section 6.

Conclusion. The prosecution may be instituted and continued as if the 1947 Act had not been repealed. A's plea fails. The punishment will be that of the 1947 Act, since Article 20(1) bars a heavier penalty than the law in force when the offence was committed.

How this is examined

As a 10-mark essay: define repeal, distinguish express and implied repeal with Palai, state the common-law position, then set out section 6(a) to (e) and sections 6A, 7, 8 and 24, with a current example (Income-tax Act, 2025 or the Labour Codes). As a 6-mark note: “Commencement of a statute” (section 5, notification, Harla, A.K. Roy) or “Perpetual and temporary statutes” (Bhupendra Kumar Bose).