Classification of administrative action

Administrative Law · Unit I · Topic 4 of 18 · 6 min read

Rule-making, quasi-judicial, purely administrative and ministerial action: how to tell them apart, why the classification once decided everything, and why after Kraipak it matters less.

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On this page

1. The four types
2. Telling quasi-judicial from administrative: the old tests
3. Kraipak: the distinction narrows
4. What the classification still decides
5. Necessity of the classification
How this is examined

Cases checked to exist. Read the judgment before quoting a holding.

Every case cited here has been checked to exist — the citation resolves and names the right parties. The propositions attributed to each case have not been verified line by line against the judgment. Case names link through to the full judgment: read it before quoting a holding in an examination answer, and never carry a proposition from notes into court on trust.

Why classify at all? For decades the label decided the result. If an act was quasi-judicial, natural justice applied and certiorari lay; if it was administrative, neither did. The modern law has softened this, but the classification still matters for delegation, for the duty to give reasons and for the kind of hearing required. An answer that only lists the four types misses the point of the question.

1. The four types

Rule-making (quasi-legislative) action. The making of rules, regulations, bye-laws, schemes and notifications of general application under a statute. It looks forward and lays down a norm for a class of persons. Example: rules framed under Article 309 for recruitment, or a notification fixing the price of a commodity.
Quasi-judicial action. A decision that affects the rights of particular persons, reached by applying a standard to facts found on evidence, usually where there is a dispute (a lis) and a duty to act judicially. Examples: cancellation of a licence, disciplinary punishment, an order of a rent controller or a tax assessment.
Purely administrative action. Action taken on grounds of policy or expediency, where the authority is not bound to follow any judicial procedure and weighs wider considerations. Examples: a decision to set up a factory, to grant or refuse a contract on commercial grounds, to transfer an officer.
Ministerial action. A duty imposed by law to be performed in a given way, with no discretion at all. Example: the collection of a tax once assessed, the registration of a document that complies with the law. Mandamus lies to compel it.

2. Telling quasi-judicial from administrative: the old tests

The starting point is Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, 1950 INSC 21, AIR 1950 SC 222, where the question was whether a requisition of premises under the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947 was open to certiorari. The majority held that it was an administrative act. Das J. laid down the tests that were repeated for twenty years:

where a statute empowers an authority to decide a dispute arising out of a claim made by one party and opposed by another, the authority must act judicially, and the act is quasi-judicial;
where there is no such lis between two parties, but the authority is empowered to do an act that will prejudicially affect the subject, it is still quasi-judicial if the statute expressly or impliedly imposes a duty to act judicially;
the decisive question is whether there is a duty to act judicially, which is found from the statute and the nature of the right affected.

The weakness of the test was that it looked for a “duty to act judicially” as something separate from the power itself. In England, Ridge v. Baldwin (House of Lords, 1963) broke this down: Lord Reid held that the duty to act judicially may be inferred from the nature of the power and its effect on the individual, and need not be found as a separate ingredient. A chief constable could not be dismissed without being told the charge and heard.

3. Kraipak: the distinction narrows

In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, 1969 INSC 129, (1969) 2 SCC 262, a selection board for the Indian Forest Service included Naqishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests of Jammu and Kashmir, who was himself a candidate. He did not sit when his own case was considered, but he took part in assessing his rivals. The selection was challenged as vitiated by bias. The Government argued that selection is an administrative act and natural justice does not apply.

Hegde J. rejected the argument. He said that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated; that the aim of natural justice is to secure justice and prevent miscarriage of justice; and that if this is so, there is no reason why the rules should be inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both. The selection was quashed.

Two years before, in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, 1967 INSC 33, AIR 1967 SC 1269, the Court had held that even an administrative order that involves civil consequences (there, the refixing of a doctor's date of birth so as to retire her earlier) must be made consistently with natural justice.

4. What the classification still decides

Natural justice and legislative action. The one firm exclusion that survives. Rule-making of general application does not attract a hearing unless the statute provides one: Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd., 1987 INSC 100, (1987) 2 SCC 720, where price fixation under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order was held legislative in character and so not subject to a hearing for each manufacturer.
The content of fairness. A quasi-judicial authority must usually give an oral hearing, disclose evidence and give reasons; a purely administrative authority may satisfy fairness with a notice and a chance to make written representation.
Delegation. A quasi-judicial power must ordinarily be exercised by the authority named in the statute and cannot be sub-delegated without authority; an administrative power is more readily exercised through subordinates.
Reasons and appeal. The duty to give reasons and the appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 (which lies from a “court or tribunal”) both attach to bodies that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power.
Remedies. Certiorari and prohibition were historically confined to judicial and quasi-judicial acts. Today they lie wherever a public authority acts in excess of power or unfairly, but the older classification is still how many High Court judgments describe the reach of the writ.

Do not overstate Kraipak. It did not abolish the classification. It held that natural justice can apply to administrative action, and the question became what fairness requires on the facts, not whether it applies at all. Legislative action remains outside, as Cynamide shows.

5. Necessity of the classification

The syllabus asks for “the necessity”. The answer: because different legal consequences follow, as listed in section 4; because statutes confer powers in general words without saying which kind they are, so courts must classify to know which controls apply; and because classification tells the authority itself what procedure it must follow. The modern approach looks at the effect on the person rather than the label, but the label remains the starting point.

How this is examined

A 10-mark essay on “classification of administrative action” or a 6-mark note on the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative action. The tests also come up in Unit III as “tests to determine when an administrative authority is required to act judicially”, which is the same material seen from the natural justice side: write Kusaldas Advani, Ridge v. Baldwin, Binapani Dei and Kraipak in that order. The note on Quasi-judicial functions and administrative adjudication takes this further.

Now try the real questions: Administrative Law past question papers.