Leading questions, lawful questions in cross-examination and compulsion to answer

1. Leading questions: section 146

Section 146(1): any question suggesting the answer which the person putting it wishes or expects to receive is a leading question. “You saw A stab B with a knife, didn’t you?” leads; “What did you see?” does not. A question that can be answered by a simple “yes” or “no” and that puts the disputed fact to the witness is usually leading.

• Examination-in-chief and re-examination (s.146(2)): leading questions must not be asked if the adverse party objects, except with the permission of the Court. The reason is that a witness is assumed to be friendly to the party calling him and may simply agree with what is put.
• When the Court shall permit them (s.146(3)): on matters that are introductory, undisputed, or in the Court’s opinion already sufficiently proved. The Court may also allow them where the witness is hostile (section 157), where a question is needed to identify a person or thing, or where the witness’s memory needs to be directed to a point.
• Cross-examination (s.146(4)): leading questions may be asked. The witness is presumed to be unfriendly to the cross-examiner, so there is less risk of a planted answer. Even here the Court may disallow a question that assumes a disputed fact or puts words into the witness’s mouth on a vital point.

In Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1993 INSC 167, the Public Prosecutor had put leading questions to prosecution witnesses in chief on the material facts. The Court held that leading questions on matters in dispute are not permissible in examination-in-chief, that evidence obtained that way is of little value, and that the procedure denied the accused a fair trial.

2. Questions lawful in cross-examination: section 149

Section 149 (old s.146): in cross-examination a witness may, besides questions on the facts in issue, be asked any question which tends

• (a) to test his veracity;
• (b) to discover who he is and his position in life; or
• (c) to shake his credit by injuring his character, even though the answer might tend to criminate him or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.

The proviso protects victims of sexual offences: in a prosecution under sections 64 to 71 BNS (rape and related offences) or an attempt, where consent is in issue, no evidence may be adduced and no question put in cross-examination about the victim’s general immoral character or previous sexual experience with any person, for proving consent or its quality. It works with section 48, which makes such evidence irrelevant.

3. Compulsion to answer: sections 137, 150 and 151

The Adhiniyam distinguishes questions by their relevance:

• Relevant questions (section 150, old s.147). If the question relates to a matter relevant to the suit or proceeding, section 137 applies: the witness must answer, even if the answer criminates him, but the compelled answer cannot be used to prosecute him except for perjury.
• Questions relevant only to credit (section 151, old s.148). If the question relates to a matter not relevant except as it affects the witness’s credit by injuring his character, the Court decides whether he shall be compelled to answer, and may warn him that he is not obliged to. Section 151(2) guides the discretion:
  • the question is proper if the truth of the imputation would seriously affect the Court’s opinion of his credibility on the matter he testifies to;
  • it is improper if the imputation relates to matters so remote in time, or of such a character, that its truth would not affect, or would only slightly affect, that opinion;
  • it is improper if there is great disproportion between the importance of the imputation and the importance of his evidence;
  • the Court may draw an adverse inference from his refusal to answer.

4. Forbidden and controlled questions: sections 152 to 155

• Section 152 (old s.149): a question under section 151 ought not to be asked unless the person asking has reasonable grounds for thinking the imputation well-founded. Instructions from another advocate that a witness is a dacoit are reasonable grounds; a random question to an unknown witness is not.
• Section 153 (old s.150): if such a question is asked by an advocate without reasonable grounds, the Court may report the matter to the High Court or other authority to which the advocate is subject.
• Section 154 (old s.151): the Court may forbid indecent or scandalous questions, unless they relate to facts in issue or to matters necessary to decide whether the facts in issue existed.
• Section 155 (old s.152): the Court shall forbid any question that appears intended to insult or annoy, or which, though proper in itself, is needlessly offensive in form.

These powers matter most in sexual offence trials. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 INSC 75, (1996) 2 SCC 384, the Court said trial courts must not be silent spectators while the prosecutrix is cross-examined in an insulting way, and should conduct such trials in camera where possible.

5. Answers to questions on credit are final: section 156

Section 156 (old s.153): when a witness has answered a question relevant only because it tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence shall be given to contradict him; if he answers falsely he may be charged with giving false evidence. The rule stops trials from running into side issues. Two exceptions:

• Previous conviction: if he denies a previous conviction, it may be proved.
• Impartiality: if he denies facts suggesting bias (for instance a blood feud between his family and the accused’s), he may be contradicted.

Illustration (c) shows the limit of the rule: where A says he saw B at Goa on a day and denies being in Varanasi that day, evidence that he was in Varanasi is admissible, not to contradict him on credit but to contradict the fact in issue that he saw B at Goa.

6. Problem

In a murder trial the Public Prosecutor asks his eyewitness in chief: “Did you see the accused strike the deceased on the head with an iron rod at 9 p.m. near the temple?” The defence objects. In cross-examination the defence asks the same witness whether he was dismissed from his last job for theft. He denies it and the defence offers the dismissal order. Decide both points.

Issue. (i) Whether the question in chief is permissible; (ii) whether the denial can be contradicted.

Law. Section 146(2) and (3); Varkey Joseph; sections 149(c), 151 and 156 and illustration (b) to section 156.

Application. (i) The question puts every disputed fact (identity, weapon, time, place) into the witness’s mouth and invites a “yes.” It is leading on matters in dispute and, on objection, cannot be asked without the Court’s permission, which should not be given. The witness should be asked what he saw. (ii) The question about dismissal for theft goes only to credit. It is a lawful question under section 149(c) and the Court decides under section 151 whether to compel an answer. Once he has answered, section 156 bars evidence to contradict him; illustration (b) to section 156 is on the point. Neither exception applies, since dismissal is not a conviction and does not touch impartiality.

Conclusion. The objection in chief is upheld. The dismissal order is not admissible to contradict the witness; if his denial was false he may be prosecuted for false evidence.

How this is examined

“Leading question” was the January 2026 short note; “Discuss the scope of cross-examination and explain the questions lawful in cross-examination” was the February 2025 ten-mark question; “Compulsion to answer questions (sections 150, 151 and 156)” is named in the syllabus. For the long answer on cross-examination, combine section 143(2) and section 146(4) from the previous note with sections 149 to 156 here.