Estoppel

1. Section 121: the general rule

Section 121 (old s.115): when one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and that person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.

Illustration: A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and so induces B to buy and pay for it. The land later becomes A’s property and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that he had no title at the time. He cannot be allowed to prove his want of title. (This is the feeding of the estoppel; see also section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.)

The English source is Pickard v. Sears (1837), where Lord Denman said that where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in a certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief, he is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things.

2. Essentials

• A representation by declaration, act or omission (silence counts where there is a duty to speak).
• The representation is of an existing fact, not a promise about the future and not a statement of law. (A promise is the field of promissory estoppel.)
• It was made intentionally to cause or permit the other to believe and act on it. Carelessness alone does not normally suffice, though a person who permits another to be misled by gross negligence may be estopped.
• The other person believed it and acted on it to his detriment, or altered his position.
• The estoppel binds only the parties and their representatives, in a suit or proceeding between them.

In B.L. Sreedhar v. K.M. Munireddy, 2002 INSC 518, (2003) 2 SCC 355, the Court discussed these elements, held that estoppel is a rule of evidence and not a cause of action, and explained the maxim allegans contraria non est audiendus (a person alleging contradictory things is not to be heard). It also held that there is no estoppel where both parties knew the true facts, and none against a statute. In Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University, 1990 INSC 118, (1990) 3 SCC 23, a student was admitted to the law course on his marksheet, allowed to study and sit the examinations; the University was held estopped from refusing to declare his result on the ground that he was not qualified for admission.

3. Kinds of estoppel

• Estoppel by record (judgment). A party is bound by a final judgment. This is the field of res judicata (section 11 CPC) and issue estoppel in criminal cases.
• Estoppel by deed. A party to a deed cannot deny the facts recited in it, as against the other party.
• Estoppel by conduct (in pais). The kind dealt with in section 121.
• Equitable estoppel, including promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel (standing by while another builds on one’s land).
• Statutory estoppels of particular relationships: tenant and licensee (section 122), and acceptor of a bill, bailee and licensee (section 123).

4. Estoppel distinguished from res judicata, waiver and presumption

• Res judicata results from a decision of the Court; estoppel from the act of a party. Res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to try the matter again; estoppel only stops a party from saying something. Res judicata bars a person from saying the same thing twice in successive litigation; estoppel prevents him from saying one thing at one time and the opposite at another. Res judicata rests on public policy that there should be an end to litigation; estoppel rests on equity and good conscience.
• Waiver is the intentional abandonment of a known right. It is contractual in nature and need not involve a representation acted on by the other side. Estoppel needs a representation and detriment, and it is a rule of evidence.
• Presumption is an inference the Court draws, usually rebuttable. Estoppel is a bar personal to the party estopped; the Court is not drawing an inference of truth, it is refusing to hear the denial.

5. Promissory estoppel

Section 121 speaks of belief in an existing fact. Promissory estoppel, which developed in equity (Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., 1947), applies to a promise intended to be acted on and in fact acted on. In India it was applied against the Government in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978 INSC 256, (1979) 2 SCC 409, where the State had promised a tax exemption to new industries and the company set up a factory on that promise. The Court held the State bound unless overriding public interest required otherwise, and that promissory estoppel can found a cause of action. It does not operate against a statute or to compel the State to do what the law forbids. The Administrative Law note Promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and proportionality covers the doctrine and its later limits in detail.

6. Estoppel of tenant and licensee: section 122

Section 122 (old s.116): no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through him, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy or at any time thereafter, be permitted to deny that his landlord had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to the property. Likewise, a person who came on immovable property by the licence of the person in possession cannot deny that the licensor had a title to such possession when the licence was given.

• The estoppel relates to title at the beginning of the tenancy. The tenant may show that the landlord’s title has since come to an end (by sale, decree or expiry).
• It continues even after the tenancy ends, until the tenant has surrendered possession to the landlord.
• It extends to a tenant inducted by the landlord’s predecessor who has attorned to the successor. In S. Thangappan v. P. Padmavathy, 1999 INSC 355, (1999) 7 SCC 474, a tenant who had been inducted by the landlord’s predecessor and had paid rent was held estopped from denying the landlord’s title in eviction proceedings.

7. Acceptor of a bill, bailee and licensee: section 123

Section 123 (old s.117): no acceptor of a bill of exchange may deny that the drawer had authority to draw or endorse it; no bailee or licensee may deny that his bailor or licensor had, when the bailment or licence began, authority to make it. Explanation 1: the acceptor may deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by whom it purports to have been drawn (forgery is open). Explanation 2: a bailee who delivers the goods to a person other than the bailor may prove that the person had a right to them as against the bailor (compare section 167 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872).

8. Problem

X lets Y into possession of a house as a tenant at Rs. 10,000 a month. Five years later, in X’s eviction suit, Y pleads that the house really belongs to Z and that X never had title. Can Y raise the plea?

Issue. Whether the tenant can deny his landlord’s title. Law. Section 122; Thangappan. Application. Y came in as X’s tenant. The estoppel covers X’s title at the beginning of the tenancy and continues while Y is in possession. Y does not say that X’s title ended after the letting (for instance by a sale to Z, or a decree in Z’s favour); he says X never had title. Conclusion. Y is estopped. He must first surrender possession to X; Z, if he has a better title, must bring his own suit against X.

How this is examined

“Discuss the law relating to estoppel” (January 2026) and “Define estoppel. Explain the various kinds of estoppel” (June 2025, February 2025, June 2025 Law of Evidence) are the standard ten-mark questions. Write section 121 and its illustration, the essentials with Sreedhar and Sanatan Gauda, the kinds, then sections 122 and 123, and close with the distinction from res judicata and waiver. Estoppel and res judicata is also set on its own as a short note.