Accomplice, approver and corroboration

1. Who is an accomplice

An accomplice is a person who has taken part in the commission of the crime, as principal or abettor, along with the accused. A person who is a guilty associate in the crime is an accomplice whether or not he is charged. Those who are not accomplices: a person who merely witnessed the crime and kept quiet out of fear; a trap witness or decoy who joins only to catch the offender (though his evidence is still examined with care); and, in most cases, the victim. Receivers of stolen goods are treated as accomplices of the thief in a trial for theft.

2. Section 138 and illustration (b) to section 119

Section 138 (old s.133): an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; “and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Old section 133 read “a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Read literally, the new text only affirms that a conviction on corroborated accomplice evidence is lawful; it no longer says in terms that an uncorroborated conviction is lawful. Whether the change alters the law has not, so far as can be confirmed, been settled by the Supreme Court. The safe course in an answer is to quote both texts and say that corroboration in material particulars, which was already the practice, is now the expectation written into the section itself.

Illustration (b) to section 119 (old s.114): the Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. Section 119(2) gives two counter-facts: where an accomplice of high character explains the common carelessness of himself and the accused, and where several accomplices captured and kept apart give accounts that corroborate one another so as to make previous concert improbable.

Reconciliation under the old law. Section 133 was the rule of law: the evidence was admissible and a conviction on it was legal. Illustration (b) was a rule of prudence: an accomplice is a self-confessed criminal, he may be trying to shift blame or earn a pardon, so the Court should ordinarily look for corroboration before acting. In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (Privy Council, 1949) the Judicial Committee said that the danger of acting on accomplice evidence is that the accomplice is liable to be swayed by self-interest and may implicate an innocent person, and that the rule of caution has become virtually a rule of law. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 INSC 63, AIR 1952 SC 54, the Supreme Court said the rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge, but he may convict without corroboration if, in the particular case, he is satisfied that it is safe to do so, provided he shows that he has the rule in mind.

3. Nature of corroboration

The test comes from R. v. Baskerville (Court of Criminal Appeal, 1916):

• Corroboration must be independent evidence, not coming from the accomplice himself.
• It must confirm in some material particular not only that the crime was committed but that the accused committed it.
• It need not confirm every detail; it is enough if it connects the accused with the crime.
• It may be direct or circumstantial.

One accomplice cannot ordinarily corroborate another: Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 INSC 302, AIR 1968 SC 832, where the Court held that the evidence of an approver needed independent corroboration, and that retracted confessions of co-accused were weak material for it. In K. Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2004 INSC 650, (2005) 1 SCC 237, a counterfeit currency case, the Court restated the relation between sections 133 and 114(b): the combined effect is that it is lawful to convict on uncorroborated accomplice evidence, but the rule of prudence requires corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime, and the Court should insist on it except in rare cases.

4. The approver

An approver is an accomplice who has been granted a pardon on condition that he makes a full and true disclosure. Under section 343 BNSS (old s.306 CrPC) the Chief Judicial Magistrate, at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, or the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, may tender a pardon in offences triable exclusively by the Court of Session or a Special Judge, or punishable with imprisonment up to seven years or more. The approver must be examined as a witness in the Magistrate’s court and at the trial, and is detained in custody until the trial ends unless already on bail. Section 344 BNSS (old s.307) lets the trial court tender a pardon after commitment. Under section 345 BNSS (old s.308), if the Public Prosecutor certifies that the approver has wilfully concealed something essential or given false evidence, he may be tried for the offence.

The approver’s evidence must satisfy a double test: first, he must be a reliable witness in himself; second, his evidence must be corroborated in material particulars connecting each accused with the crime.

5. Corroboration of witnesses generally: sections 159 and 160

• Section 159 (old s.156): when a witness whom it is intended to corroborate gives evidence of a relevant fact, he may be questioned about other circumstances he observed at or near the time or place, if they would corroborate his testimony. Illustration: an accomplice describing a robbery may describe incidents on the way to and from the scene, and independent evidence of those incidents may be given.
• Section 160 (old s.157): to corroborate a witness, any former statement made by him relating to the same fact, at or about the time the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate it, may be proved. The first information report and a statement recorded by a Magistrate under section 183 BNSS (old s.164 CrPC) are used this way. A complaint made by a victim to her mother soon after the event was used in Rameshwar.
• Section 161 (old s.158): when a statement relevant under section 26 or 27 (statements of persons who cannot be called, and evidence in former proceedings) is proved, anything may be proved to contradict or corroborate it, or to impeach or confirm the credit of its maker, as if he had been called as a witness.

6. Problem

A, B and C are charged with dacoity. C is pardoned and examined as an approver. He says A and B were with him. The police recovered part of the stolen property from A’s house on his information. There is nothing against B except C’s word. Decide.

Issue. Whether A and B can be convicted on the approver’s evidence.

Law. Section 138; illustration (b) to section 119; section 343 BNSS; Baskerville; K. Hashim; section 23 BSA proviso (recovery on information from an accused in custody, Unit II).

Application. C is competent and his evidence is admissible. As to A, the recovery of stolen property from his house on his own information is independent evidence that connects him with the dacoity; with the presumption in illustration (a) to section 119 it corroborates C in a material particular. As to B, there is no independent evidence. Section 138 now speaks of conviction on corroborated accomplice testimony, and even under the old law the rule of prudence required corroboration as against each accused. There is none against B.

Conclusion. A may be convicted if C is otherwise reliable. B should be acquitted.

How this is examined

“Accomplice” was the June 2025 short note; “Corroborative evidence” the February 2025 short note; “Approver’s testimony” is named in the syllabus. For the long form, define accomplice, set out section 138 and illustration (b), reconcile them with Bhuboni Sahu and Rameshwar, state the Baskerville test, then the approver under section 343 BNSS.