Assault, battery, mayhem and false imprisonment

1. Trespass to the person: the common features

Trespass to the person is a direct and intentional interference with the body or liberty of another without lawful justification. Three features run through all its forms:

• Directness. The harm must follow directly from the defendant's act. An indirect injury is remedied in case (negligence), not trespass.
• Intention or voluntariness. The act must be voluntary. Motive is irrelevant; a well-meant touching can still be a battery.
• Actionable per se. Nominal damages are available without proof of loss, and substantial or exemplary damages where the conduct is oppressive.

Most of these acts are also offences. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines force (s.128), criminal force (s.129, old s.350 IPC), assault (s.130, old s.351 IPC), wrongful restraint (s.126, old s.339 IPC), wrongful confinement (s.127, old s.340 IPC) and grievous hurt (s.116, old s.320 IPC). The civil action and the prosecution are independent of each other.

2. Assault

An assault is an act that causes the plaintiff reasonable apprehension of immediate unlawful force. No contact is needed. The essentials are:

• an act or gesture by the defendant threatening force;
• an apparent present ability to carry out the threat; and
• a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff.

In Stephens v. Myers (1830), the defendant advanced on the chairman of a parish meeting with a clenched fist and was stopped just short of him. That was an assault, because he was near enough to strike. Words can negative an assault: in Tuberville v. Savage (1669), the defendant laid his hand on his sword and said, “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.” Since the assizes were on, the words showed he did not intend to strike, and there was no assault. Pointing an unloaded gun at a person who does not know it is unloaded is an assault, since what matters is the plaintiff's reasonable belief.

3. Battery

Battery is the intentional application of force to the person of another without lawful justification. The least touching may be enough. In Cole v. Turner (1704) Holt C.J. said that “the least touching of another in anger is a battery”. Force need not be applied by hand: throwing water, spitting, or pulling a chair from under a person can each be a battery. The essentials are (a) use of force, however slight; (b) without consent or lawful justification; and (c) directly by the defendant.

Assault usually precedes battery, but either can exist without the other. A blow from behind is a battery without an assault; a threatening gesture that is stopped in time is an assault without a battery.

Defences. Consent (express or implied, as in games played within the rules), self-defence with reasonable force, lawful arrest, parental or reasonable correction within the limits now set by law, and necessity (for example, emergency medical treatment of an unconscious person).

4. Mayhem

Mayhem is an old form of aggravated battery: depriving a person of a member of the body that he could use to defend himself, such as an arm, a leg or an eye. In early English law it was both a felony and a ground of civil action. Modern writers treat it as battery causing serious bodily injury; its importance today is in the quantum of damages. Its criminal counterpart in India is grievous hurt under s.116 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which covers emasculation, permanent loss of sight or hearing, loss of a member or joint, and similar injuries.

5. False imprisonment

False imprisonment is the total restraint of a person's liberty, for any period however short, without lawful justification. “Imprisonment” does not need a prison: locking a person in a room, or forcibly holding him in the street, is enough. The essentials are:

• Total restraint. In Bird v. Jones (1845), part of a public bridge was fenced off for spectators of a boat race. The plaintiff insisted on passing through and was prevented, though he was free to go back the way he came. The court held there was no false imprisonment: blocking one route while leaving another open is a partial restraint. The restraint must have boundaries on all sides.
• Without lawful justification. An arrest under a valid warrant or a lawful arrest without warrant under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is a defence.
• Knowledge of the plaintiff is not necessary. In Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation Co. (1919), the plaintiff, suspected of theft, was kept in a room by works police without knowing that he was not free to leave. He was held to have been falsely imprisoned. Atkin L.J. said a person can be imprisoned while asleep, drunk or unconscious. The fact of restraint, not the plaintiff's awareness, constitutes the tort; lack of knowledge may reduce damages.

Two limits are often examined. A person who enters premises on terms may be held to those terms: in Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry Co. (1910), a passenger who refused to pay the penny exit charge was not falsely imprisoned. And in Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Co. (1915), a miner who stopped work in breach of contract had no claim when the employer refused to bring him up the shaft before the end of the shift.

6. Illegal detention by the State: constitutional tort

Where the restraint is by the police or another public authority, the victim can sue in tort, but the Supreme Court has also developed a public law remedy of compensation under Articles 32 and 226 for violation of Article 21.

• Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, 1983 INSC 85, (1983) 4 SCC 141. The petitioner was kept in jail for over fourteen years after his acquittal. The Court ordered compensation in a habeas corpus petition, holding that a mere order of release would not undo the wrong and that Article 21 would be stripped of meaning if the State could deprive a person of liberty without paying for it. The right to sue for damages in a civil court was left open.
• Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1985) 4 SCC 677, AIR 1986 SC 494. An MLA was arrested and kept from attending the Assembly session, and was not produced before a magistrate within the time the law requires. The Court held his detention illegal and awarded exemplary compensation of ₹50,000 against the State, on the footing that police officers who are the custodians of the law had treated it with contempt.
• Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, 1993 INSC 113, (1993) 2 SCC 746, later confirmed that this liability is strict and that sovereign immunity is no defence to it.

7. Problem

A, a shopkeeper, suspects B of shoplifting and locks him in a back room for two hours while he calls the police. B was asleep on a bench for most of the period and did not try the door. Nothing is found on B. Advise B.

Issue. Whether B was falsely imprisoned though he did not know of the restraint, and whether A had lawful justification.

Law. False imprisonment is total restraint without lawful justification (Bird v. Jones). Knowledge of the plaintiff is not necessary (Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation). The tort is actionable per se.

Application. The locked room was a total restraint with no means of exit. A's suspicion was not lawful authority; a private person's power of arrest is narrow and does not extend to locking up a suspect on mere suspicion where nothing is found. B's sleep does not matter for liability, though it may lower the damages since he suffered less distress.

Conclusion. A is liable to B for false imprisonment. B may also claim for damage to reputation if the detention was public. A may face a charge of wrongful confinement under s.127 BNS.

How this is examined

Usually a 6-mark short note: “Assault and battery”, “False imprisonment” or “Mayhem”. For a 10-mark answer, combine the four, open with the common features of trespass to the person, give one case per element (Stephens v. Myers, Cole v. Turner, Bird v. Jones, Meering) and close with Rudul Sah and Bhim Singh on compensation for illegal detention. A problem on a shopkeeper detaining a suspect, or a person locked in by mistake, is answered as above.