qui tacet consentire videtur

The maxim says that silence, where a person ought to speak, may be treated as agreement. It is used in estoppel and acquiescence: an owner who stands by silently while another builds on his land believing it to be his own may be prevented from later asserting his right.

Its scope is narrow, and students should note where it does not apply. In contract, silence is generally not acceptance; an offeror cannot impose a contract by saying that silence will be taken as consent (Felthouse v. Bindley, 1862). Under section 17 of the Contract Act, mere silence is not fraud unless there is a duty to speak or the silence is itself equivalent to speech.

Example

Since he had no duty to speak, the buyer's silence could not be treated as consent under qui tacet consentire videtur, and no contract arose.

In Indian law

• s.17 Explanation, Indian Contract Act, 1872 (mere silence is not fraud)
• Felthouse v. Bindley (Court of Common Pleas, England, 1862)

See also

acceptance · estoppel · fraud · doctrine of waiver

Read more in the study notes

• State territorial sovereignty: acquisition, restrictions and loss (Public International Law)